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the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA). Traditionally, the NPA’s approach to motor 
vehicle accidents caused by dangerous or irresponsible driving resulting in death has 
been to charge the person responsible with culpable homicide. However, in March 2010 
the NPA decided to proactively pursue a more “aggressive” prosecutorial strategy by 
bringing charges of murder and attempted murder against Molemo “Jub Jub” 
Maarohanye and his co-accused for having collided with a group of schoolchildren while 
“drag racing”.1 Ostensibly the NPA’s rationale for a more aggressive approach to such 
cases is to increase the preventative and deterrent effects of punishment among South 
African road users, especially dangerous drivers and those motorists prone to risk 
taking. The underlying intention of this strategy is to counteract the high number of 
fatalities on South African public roads that occur as a result of dangerous or reckless 
driving. However, the ruling of the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) in Humphreys v The 
State illustrates that this enterprise, however desirable or well received it may be 
amongst the public, may not always be justifiable in terms of the established principles 
of substantive criminal law.2     
Following the NPA’s new approach in the “Jub Jub” case, and also due to the 
media attention devoted to the incident, there has been much debate in legal and public 
spheres over whether drivers responsible for killing or injuring persons due to 
dangerous driving can or should be charged with intent based crimes (specifically 
murder and attempted murder). The ruling in Humphreys represents the latest legal 
development on this front. This case emanates from another well-known incident, 
which occurred later in 2010, and which is also broadly related to death and serious 
injury resulting from dangerous driving, namely, the appeal against the convictions of 
murder and attempted murder handed down to Jacob Humphreys in the Western Cape 
High Court for causing the death of ten schoolchildren and injuring four others when the 
minibus he was driving collided with a train. Some seem to have interpreted the SCA's 
ruling as having provided a conclusive answer to the pertinent question of appropriate 
charges in relation to irresponsible or dangerous driving which results in the death of or 
serious injury to an innocent party.3 However, this article submits that a proper 
understanding of the judgment is that the legal principles pertaining to dolus eventualis 
are clarified through correct application of the law in the specific circumstances of the 
incident.  
                                                 
1 This incident occurred on 8 March 2010 in Protea North, Soweto. Four teenage boys were killed and two 
seriously injured. The accused were later convicted of four counts of murder and two of attempted 
murder on the basis of having possessed intent in the form of dolus eventualis. Regarding the NPA’s 
aggressive approach to irresponsible drivers, see also National Prosecuting Authority - Khasho News Letter 
(February/March 2012) at 13. 
2 Humphreys v The State (424/12) [2013] ZASCA 20 (22 March 2013). 
3See “Humphreys’ sentence a lifeline for Jub Jub” IOL News, 25 March 2013, available at 
http://www.iol.co.za/news/crime-courts/humphreys-sentence-a-lifeline-for-jub-jub-
1.1491005#.UVWdVKuFBnI (accessed 30 March 2013). The Western Cape MEC for transport referred to 
the judgment as “disappointing”, see “Driver’s reduced sentence ‘disappointing’” News24, 22 March 2013, 
available at http://www.news24.com/ SouthAfrica/News/Killer-drivers-reduced-sentence-
disappointing-20130322 (accessed 25 March 2013). 
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2 BACKGROUND TO AND THE DECISION IN THE WESTERN CAPE HIGH 
COURT 
On 25 August 2010, Jacob Humphreys had been the primary cause of a collision 
between a minibus (of which he was the driver) carrying 14 schoolchildren and a train 
in the vicinity of Blackheath, Cape Town. The testimony of two passengers that the 
accused had overtaken a number of stationary vehicles at the Buttskop railway crossing 
and had ignored various warning signs in his illegal attempt to navigate the minibus 
through the crossing was accepted by the Western Cape High Court. It was also accepted 
that the accused had been aware at the time that a train was approaching the crossing.4 
The ensuing collision claimed the lives of ten children and resulted in injuries to 
another four passengers as well as to the accused. Humphreys was subsequently 
charged with murder and attempted murder. 
The Western Cape High Court ruled that the accused was guilty of the 
aforementioned crimes, having found that he possessed intent in the form of dolus 
eventualis. The test for dolus eventualis consists of two requirements. First, it requires 
subjective foresight on the part of the accused as regards the possibility of committing 
an unlawful act or creating an unlawful result. Secondly, it is required for the accused to 
accept this possibility into the bargain. Regarding the requirement of foresight, the 
judge ruled that circumstantial evidence had established that it could be inferred that 
the accused had been aware that his action could lead to death or serious injury.5 The 
court held that this conclusion was supported, inter alia, by the following facts. First, 
that where a person drives a vehicle into the path of an oncoming train, death or serious 
injury to persons is a commonly accepted consequence.6 Secondly, that due to the 
accused’s experience and knowledge of trains (as a result of his former employment as a 
‘shunter’ for Transnet, and also confirmed through his own testimony), he was aware of 
this danger.7 
Regarding the volitional component of dolus eventualis, the judge compared the 
conduct of the accused in the incident to “a person who throws a man into a cage full of 
hungry lions” and that the accused had acted “almost like someone playing Russian 
Roulette”.8 According to the court, the accused knew that his conduct – driving in the 
manner in which he did - could lead to death or serious injury.9 Due to his decision to 
persist in driving in such a way, the court found that he had been reckless.10 
 
                                                 
4 S v Humphreys (Western Cape High Court) Case No. SS10/2011, 31 December 2012 at para 62. 
5 S v Humphreys at para 62. 
6 S v Humphreys at para 62. 
7 S v Humphreys at para 62. 
8 S v Humphreys at para 65 (my translation). 
9 S v Humphreys at para 65. 
10 S v Humphreys at para 65. The appropriateness of the Western Cape High Court’s reference to 
‘recklessness’ in applying the test for dolus eventualis was specifically addressed by the SCA in the 
subsequent appeal. This is discussed further below. 
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3 RATIO DECIDENDI OF THE JUDGMENT ON APPEAL 
On appeal, the SCA (in a unanimous judgment per Brand JA) overturned the judgment of 
the Western Cape High Court and ruled that the accused did not possess the requisite 
intention to commit murder, but should rather be convicted of culpable homicide due to 
his extreme recklessness and flagrant negligence with regard to the death of the 
victims.11 In its judgment the SCA set aside the accused’s convictions on ten counts of 
murder and four counts of attempted murder and replaced them with convictions on 
ten counts of culpable homicide. The accused’s sentence was accordingly reduced from 
20 to 8 years’ imprisonment ante-dated to 28 February 2012. 
Regarding the first component of dolus eventualis, the SCA essentially agreed 
with the finding of the Western Cape High Court, namely, that the accused had 
subjectively foreseen the death of his passengers as a possible consequence of his 
conduct.12 The court held that a right-minded person who ignores the preventative 
measures presented to the accused prior to the accident (“clear warning signals of an 
approaching train” and “a boom specifically aimed at preventing traffic to enter a 
railway crossing”) would recognise the possibility of fatal consequences.13 According to 
Brand JA: “To deny this foresight would in my view be comparable to a denial of 
foreseeing the possibility that a stab wound in the chest may be fatal.”14 
The court then proceeded to a more detailed discussion of whether the existence 
of the second component of dolus eventualis had been established.15 The SCA’s ruling 
was based largely on the fact that the accused had no deliberate desire to expose the 
children in the minibus to the risk of death as a result of the illegal manoeuvre he had 
decided to execute on the day in question. The court held that it could be inferred that 
the accused “may have thought that the possible collision he subjectively foresaw would 
not actually occur”.16 The SCA advanced two reasons for coming to this conclusion. First, 
common sense dictates that a desire on the part of the accused to expose his passengers 
to the risk of death or serious injury would also entail a desire to expose himself to a 
similar risk. According to the SCA, such a conclusion is unwarranted since there was no 
evidence to indicate that the accused had taken the possibility of his own death into the 
bargain.17 The court held that a failure to show that the accused harboured a desire to 
endanger himself creates a strong inference in favour of negligent behaviour rather than 
a legal intention to commit murder.18  
                                                 
11 Humphreys v The State at paras 17 and 20. This, together with the SCA’s acceptance of the Western Cape 
High Court’s finding that the accused had foreseen the possibility of the death of his passengers, seems to 
indicate that he possessed fault in the form of luxuria or conscious negligence. However, this is not 
specifically mentioned anywhere in the judgment. 
12 Humphreys v The State at para 14. 
13 Humphreys v The State at para 14. 
14 Humphreys v The State at para 14. 
15 Humphreys v The State at paras 15-19. 
16 Humphreys v The State at para 17. 
17 Humphreys v The State at para 18. 
18 It must be mentioned that many writers have pointed out the irrelevance of the accused’s desire to 
bring about an unlawful consequence. The desire to cause someone’s death should not be confused with 
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Secondly, the court held that the attempted manoeuvre was “practically 
possible”.19 Furthermore, the fact that the accused had successfully used this 
manoeuvre on previous occasions indicates that he subjectively, and through a 
"misplaced sense of confidence", believed that no harm would flow from his actions on 
the day in question.20 The fact that the accused thought he would (not could) make it 
safely through the crossing without incident indicates strongly that he had at no stage 
reconciled himself to the possibility that he might be placing the lives of his passengers 
at risk.  
In the High Court the accused had testified that he did not under any 
circumstances wish to cause the children any harm.21 According to his own testimony 
they were like his own children.22 Indeed, the accused had been transporting children to 
school for nearly ten years using the same route.23 The accused is described as a family 
man who is well respected within his community.24 Although this was not specifically 
addressed in the SCA’s judgment, the judges must have been aware of these 
considerations, which do not seem to be disputed and which support the accuracy of the 
SCA’s inferences about the accused’s state of mind at the time leading up to the incident. 
As rightly pointed out by Snyman, indirect evidence of this kind is a valuable and often 
the only means of determining whether an accused had intent and may be crucial to the 
exercise of inferential reasoning.25  
4 THE IMPORT OF THE HUMPHREYS JUDGMENT 
The exact scope and value of the volitional component of dolus eventualis has long 
presented a point of contention in South African criminal law. As observed by Whiting, 
the problem emanates broadly from the fact that “conscious risk-taking may take a very 
wide variety of forms, and […] the decision in a given case on whether or not the 
                                                                                                                                                        
the desire to risk causing someone’s death. The latter is a form of “imputed intent”, which is tantamount to 
dolus eventualis (not because the accused desires the death of a person, but because the accused is willing 
to risk causing a person’s death). See Snyman CR Strafreg (2012) at 197; Kemp GP Criminal Law in South 
Africa (2012) at 186. This was also confirmed in S v Ngubane 1985 (3) SA 677 (A) at 685.  
19 Humphreys v The State at para 19. 
20 Humphreys v The State at para 19. Humphreys essentially benefitted from the fact that he had 
successfully used the exact same manoeuvre on previous occasions. On moral grounds, it might be argued 
that the judgment amounts to an unfair benefit only for those motorists who take risks regularly and 
successfully. The SCA cannot be faulted for this result, as it flows directly from the application of the 
established legal principles of dolus eventualis under which dolus is determined subjectively. One might 
also approach this critique from another angle, namely, that, because of the bona fide beliefs of the 
accused in Humphreys, his conduct was less morally blameworthy than it would have been for a person 
without such beliefs. Irrespective of the above arguments, it goes without saying that any moral argument 
cannot hold sway in a court of law charged with the objective application of legal principles. Moreover, an 
accused with a history of responsible driving should benefit through a more lenient sentence upon 
conviction. 
21 S v Humphreys at para 36. 
22 S v Humphreys at para 36. 
23 Humphreys v The State at para 3. 
24 Humphreys v The State at para 25. 
25 Snyman (2012) at 195. These words proved almost prophetic in Humphreys as the accused testified 
that he remembered absolutely nothing about the incident. 
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requirements of dolus eventualis have been satisfied may be influenced by a number of 
factors”.26 This is especially true in cases involving dangerous or irresponsible driving. 
It cannot be denied that most people in the modern world are in some way dependent 
on vehicular transport for their livelihood. The problem is compounded by the fact that 
it is likely, even understandable, for all but the most scrupulous of drivers to take risks 
at some stage during the course of their lives. Motor vehicle transport is an inherently 
risky27, yet indispensable, social activity. Accidents can and do happen every day. It is 
within this larger context that the legal principles of fault must serve to determine the 
criminal liability of those that have caused fatal accidents, so as to punish such persons 
in accordance with their moral blameworthiness. The SCA’s judgment in Humphreys 
must also be scrutinised against this background. 
A unanimous judgment of the SCA creates a strong precedent regarding the 
ambit of the test for the presence of dolus eventualis, especially in relation to the second 
part of the test, that it must be shown that the accused had disregarded or ‘reconciled 
himself with’ the risk, which s/he had subjectively foreseen as a possibility. However, 
the judgment does not create a precedent for irresponsible motorists not to be charged 
with crimes requiring intent in the form of dolus eventualis.28 Rather, the judgment 
argues convincingly that the second part of the dolus eventualis enquiry should not be 
mistaken for something equivalent to the notion of recklessness as it relates to 
aggravated negligence.29 As set out in S v De Bruyn, dolus eventualis requires an 
“insensitive recklessness (which has nothing in common with culpa)” (my emphasis).30 
The judgment in Humphreys reiterates Jansen JA’s dictum in S v Ngubane according to 
which it is possible for a person to “foresee the possibility of harm and yet be negligent 
[or reckless in the extreme] in respect of that harm ensuing”.31 According to the SCA in 
Humphreys, this is exactly where the High Court erred in its judgment.32 The SCA held 
                                                 
26 Whiting R “Thoughts on Dolus Eventualis” (1988) 1 South African Journal of Criminal Justice 430. 
27 Snyman (2012) at 224. Snyman observes that it could be argued that driving a motor car is always a 
negligent act: “Andersins kan betoog word dat die blote bestuur van ‘n motor altyd ‘n nalatige handeling is, 
want dit is voorsienbaar dat selfs met groot voorsorg aan die kant van die bestuurder, die blote bestuur van 
‘n motor moontlik iemand anders se dood kan veroorsaak.” 
28See for example “Prosecution accepts Humphreys decision” News24 available at 
http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Prosecution-accepts-Humphreys-decision-20130322 
(accessed 26 March 2013); see also footnote 3 supra. 
29 Humphreys v The State at para 17. See also Smith PT “Recklessness in Dolus Eventualis” (1979) 96 
South African Law Journal 81 at 86-87: “…the requirement of recklessness in dolus eventualis is the result 
of an historical accident. In adopting s 140 of the Transkeian Penal Code [according to which “culpable 
homicide becomes murder […] (b) If the offender means to cause the person killed any bodily injury 
which is known to the offender to be likely to cause death, and if the offender, whether he does or does 
not mean to cause death, is reckless whether death ensues or not” (my emphasis)], the court in Valachia’s 
case introduced into South African law a concept that was not only unwarranted by the weight of 
previous decisions, but also a misleading expression of the English law.” 
30 S v De Bruyn 1968 (4) SA 498 (A) at 510; see also S v Du Preez 1972 (4) SA 584 (A) at 589 where it was 
held that “to shoot with a pistol in the direction of a moving human being [in order to scare that person 
off] leaving so small a margin of safety may indeed fairly be described as reckless conduct; but reckless 
conduct per se is not necessarily to be equated with dolus eventualis”. 
31 S v Ngubane at 685; Humphreys v The State at para 15. 
32 Humphreys v The State at para 16: “It seems to me that the court a quo had been influenced by the 
confusion in terminology against which Jansen JA sounded a note of caution in Ngubane.” 
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that the accused believed “that the possible collision he subjectively foresaw would not 
actually occur”.33 
It is well established that negligence can vary greatly in its severity, a factor that 
will ultimately affect the guilty party’s sentence only.34 Yet no matter how severe the 
accused’s negligence, it can never pass the invisible threshold between extreme forms of 
conscious negligence (which requires a failure to live up to an objective legal standard 
and focuses on what the accused should have done in order to avoid an unlawful result) 
and intent in the form of dolus eventualis (which constitutes a subjective state of mind 
focusing on whether the accused had actually accepted or reconciled himself with the 
fact that an unlawful consequence could follow).35 Cases involving recklessness should, 
depending on the degree thereof, be prosecuted either on the basis of conscious 
negligence (luxuria), which is an aggravated form of negligence accompanied by 
foresight of creating or bringing about an unlawful result or situation; or 
(“unconscious”) negligence, which is not accompanied by any form of foresight by the 
accused of the unlawfulness of his/her actions. The judgment in Humphreys is a good 
illustration of inferential reasoning, which avoids the unwarranted application of 
objective standards to the volitional component of dolus eventualis (by, for example, not 
referring to what an “ordinary” or “reasonable” person would have done under similar 
conditions). According to Brand JA: 
[L]ike any other fact, subjective foresight can be proved by inference. Moreover, common sense 
dictates that the process of inferential reasoning may start out from the premise that, in 
accordance with common human experience, the possibility of the consequence that ensued 
would have been obvious to any person of normal intelligence. The next step would then be to ask 
whether, in the light of all the facts and circumstances of the case, there is any reason to think that 
the appellant would not have shared this foresight, derived from common human experience, 
with other members of the general population.36  
It seems to me that Brand JA’s references to, for example, “a right minded person”37 and 
“any person of normal intelligence” (in the quotation above), instead of a ‘reasonable’ or 
‘ordinary’ person, indicate that these dicta have been carefully worded in order to 
differentiate more clearly between the tests for dolus eventualis and conscious 
negligence as well as to guard against creating the impression that the accused’s state of 
mind is being determined with reference to objective standards. 
Ultimately, intent in the form of dolus eventualis and conscious negligence 
(especially cases involving extreme recklessness) are still separated by a fine line 
located somewhere between deliberate and accidental criminal conduct and which can 
only be properly separated through a case-by-case approach to the determination of 
fault. Every “moment of extreme irresponsibility” (to echo Brand JA’s description of 
                                                 
33 Humphreys v The State at para 17. 
34 Kemp (2012) at 202. 
35 S v Ngubane at 686: “[D]olus connotes a volitional state of mind; culpa connotes a failure to measure up 
to a standard of conduct”; Skeen A “Criminal Law” in Joubert WA and Faris JA (eds.) The Law of South 
Africa (2004) at 83: “Reckless conduct as such – even if it is in the highest degree reprehensible – is not 
sufficient to establish dolus eventualis […]”. See also Snyman (2012) at 194-195. 
36 Humphreys v The State at para 13. 
37 Humphreys v The State at para 14. 
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Humphreys’s conduct) lies on the verge of intent and might be found to amount to dolus 
eventualis.38 According to Burchell (citing the work of Whiting with approval), “even 
foresight of the substantial possibility that death may result from [driving] a vehicle 
may not be sufficient to establish dolus eventualis as opposed to negligence”.39 The type 
of risk taken by the accused will have a crucial impact on the element of fault. In the 
event of a “specific concrete risk” (as opposed to a “general statistical risk”) on the part 
of the accused, it may be more likely to infer that the volitional element of dolus 
eventualis has been satisfied.40 However, even in situations, such as that in the 
Humphreys case, where the accused had taken a specific concrete risk, it does not 
automatically follow that he had reconciled himself to the possibility of causing death or 
serious injury. The state is also required to show that the accused had taken the risk 
that death may result “not caring whether it ensues or not”.41 Herein lies the danger of 
reference to recklessness in the test for dolus eventualis. The danger emanates from the 
double meaning that may be afforded to the term “recklessness” in the grammatical 
sense, where recklessness broadly connotes indifference as regards the consequences of 
one’s actions. In order to be guilty of an intent based crime, it must be shown that the 
accused was reckless in a subjective sense. This refers to a person being truly indifferent 
or uncaring as regards the possible consequences of his/her actions. It will not suffice to 
show that the accused had been unjustifiably indifferent, unthinking or indifferent 
where he/she should not have been, which connotes recklessness in the objective sense. 
In S v Qeqe, dolus eventualis in the context of murder was defined as 
“[performing] an action knowing and foreseeing that somebody may be killed, yet 
despite that knowledge and reckless of the eventuation of the possible result, persists with 
that action” (my emphasis).42 This formulation is particularly representative of how the 
volitional component of dolus eventualis has hereto been defined by courts and criminal 
law scholars.43 On the strength of the judgment in Humphreys, it may be argued that the 
emphasised text above constitutes an unfairly restrictive formulation of the volitional 
                                                 
38 Humphreys v The State at para 25. 
39 Burchell J South African Criminal Law and Procedure (2011) at 392.  
40Burchell (2011) at 392; Whiting (1988) at 441-442. This seems to have been the case in S v Combrink 
2012 (1) SACR 93 (SCA). The accused, by his own testimony, had described himself as “an experienced 
hunter and a very good marksman” (at 98).  He had fired two shots at an unidentified person on his farm 
after that person had failed to respond to his calls. It is submitted that this constituted the taking of a 
“specific concrete risk” by the accused. The second shot resulted in the death of what emerged to be one 
of the accused’s employees. The court held that the accused had “fired the second shot knowing that the 
bullet might fatally strike the deceased” and that he was guilty of murder on the basis of dolus evetualis 
(at 99).  
41S v De Bruyn at 510. Strikingly similar wording was used in R v Huebsch 1953 (2) SA 561 (A), namely, 
that the accused had continued to act “not caring what the result might be” (at 568). 
42S v Qeqe 2012 (2) SACR 41 (ECG) at 48. This case also involved dangerous driving resulting in death of 
innocent persons. The accused had stolen a vehicle and was being pursued by the police. He was speeding 
through an area where there were many pedestrians when he lost control of the vehicle resulting in the 
death of three children. He was convicted on three counts of murder on the basis of intent in the form of 
dolus eventualis. 
43See for example Snyman (2012) at 190; Burchell (2011) at 369. The latter author discusses the 
relevance of recklessness in the test for dolus eventualis in some detail (at 390-393). See also De la Harpe 
S and Van der Walt T “The Volitional Component of Dolus Eventualis” (2003) 16 South African Journal of 
Criminal Justice 207 at 208. 
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component. It is unfairly restrictive in the sense that it ignores other factors, which may 
be relevant to the overall subjective inquiry to determine whether the accused 
possessed intent. The Humphreys decision reiterates the basic point of departure in this 
regard, namely, that it must be established through inference “what actually went on in 
the mind of the accused” (my emphasis).44 Thus, an accused having foreseen some risk 
to a planned course of action and who also “persists with that action” (as formulated in 
Qeqe above) does not necessarily reconcile him- or herself with, or consent to, the 
possibility of that risk occurring. There may be other factors relevant to the 
determination of the accused’s state of mind, which must be considered. As highlighted 
in Humphreys, an accused’s genuine albeit misplaced confidence in their ability to 
prevent the risk from materialising is enough to negate intention.45  
5 THE NPA’S “AGGRESSIVE" STRATEGY AND THE APPROPRIATE CHARGES 
FOR DANGEROUS OR IRRESPONSIBLE DRIVING WHICH RESULTS IN THE 
DEATH OF AN INNOCENT PARTY 
The judgment in Humphreys is commendable for its clarity and sound reasoning. It re-
affirms the fundamental tenet that the legal principles of dolus eventualis must be 
judged on the merits and applied to the specific facts before the court. Thus, if a 
reasonable inference leads to the conclusion that the accused had no subjective desire 
to risk the lives of others, he/she cannot be guilty of murder or attempted murder. The 
judgment does not create a precedent for making it generally impossible, more difficult 
or ill advised to charge dangerous or irresponsible drivers with murder. Upon an 
extreme interpretation it indicates that, practically speaking, it may be rare to find cases 
in which this can be done with a reasonable prospect of securing a successful 
conviction. Therefore, due consideration must be given to the fact that the case against 
Jacob Humphreys was, like all cases, bound by a unique set of facts.  
In Humphreys this uniqueness lies especially in one important aspect of the case, 
namely, the fact that the incident produced no victims beyond those inside the vehicle 
driven by the accused. It is submitted that this aspect of the case calls for a cautious 
approach to preliminary assessments of the judgment as one providing prosecutorial 
guidance for all cases involving dangerous driving or extreme recklessness by 
motorists.46 This argument can best be illustrated through the use of a hypothetical 
example using facts that are substantially similar to those of the Humphreys case. By 
borrowing from the facts of the Humphreys case, it is possible to create a similar 
hypothetical incident, but which also involves the loss of the life of a person other than 
those in the same vehicle as the accused. The hypothetical incident is differentiated by 
                                                 
44 S v Sigwahla 1967 (4) SA 566 (A) at 570. 
45 This was also highlighted in S v Maritz 1996 (1) SACR 405 (A), where it was held that an accused does 
not accept any risk if he believes that he is able to avoid its occurrence. At 416: “Die dader self aanvaar nie 
die risiko van die gevolge nie waar hy oortuig is dat hy die intree daarvan kan verhoed. Dat sy oortuiging ex 
post facto blyk verkeerd te gewees het, ding nie daarvan af nie dat 'n mens tog nie kan sê dat iemand 'n 
gevolg opsetlik veroorsaak het, net omdat hy die gevolg voorsien het nie, indien hy gehandel het in die 
oortuiging dat dit tog nie sal intree nie.” 
46 See (n 3 and 28 above). 
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substituting, respectively, a traffic intersection for the railway crossing and another 
motor vehicle (for example, a sedan type vehicle occupied by only the driver) for the 
train. Furthermore, it is posited that one person from each vehicle is killed in a collision 
caused by a manoeuvre substantially similar to that in the Humphreys case. The 
manoeuvre is one in which the accused, after having foreseen the possibility of a 
collision with another vehicle, overtakes numerous cars in an attempt to cross a traffic 
intersection five to ten seconds after the traffic light has changed to indicate that all 
oncoming traffic (including the accused’s car) must stop. As in Humphreys, the 
irresponsible driver survives the accident. 
In contrast to the facts in the Humphreys case, in this hypothetical scenario it is 
highly probable for injuries or death to occur among the persons travelling in both 
vehicles. If we apply the reasoning of the Humphreys judgment to the accused in our 
hypothetical case, he, although having foreseen the possibility of “killing the deceased, 
or someone in the same position, class or category, in substantially the same manner as 
he did in fact kill him”47, would be found guilty of culpable homicide with regard to the 
death of his passenger (the first deceased) except where it can be shown that he had 
been “indifferent as to whether he [himself] would live or die”.48  
But could the same be said about the death of the driver (the second deceased) of 
the other vehicle? Since the second deceased had been travelling in a separate vehicle, 
his fate is not tied to that of the accused, as was the case for all the deceased in the 
Humphreys case. It is neither unrealistic nor unusual for motorists who had foreseen the 
possibility that their conduct may give rise to an unlawful consequence not to take the 
possible risk against their own lives into the bargain. It is also possible for a court to 
infer that an accused held the belief that he/she would survive a collision even though it 
had been foreseen by that accused that the death of an innocent party might occur. This 
could certainly be the case in situations where pedestrians are killed as a result of 
extremely dangerous driving (the “Jub Jub” case could serve as a possible example). In 
such cases the first reason advanced by the SCA in concluding that the second 
component of dolus eventualis was not satisfied in the Humphreys case (failure to show 
that the accused harboured a desire to endanger himself) no longer applies. In the 
hypothetical scenario it may be said that the accused had persisted with his conduct in 
spite of his foresight and had consciously taken a risk by jumping the traffic light. 
Furthermore, this fact cannot be refuted, as was correctly done by the SCA in the 
Humphreys case, by creating a nexus between the fortunes of the accused and the 
second deceased. This in turn, cannot serve to negate the second part of the test for 
dolus eventualis.  
It goes without saying that, as in the hypothetical scenario, the factual reasoning 
of the court in the Humphreys judgment cannot apply to other cases. Even where it has 
been shown that the accused had foreseen the possibility of an accident and had 
regarded his own life as immaterial, indirect evidence, for example, of a subjective 
confidence in his/her ability to avoid an accident, could indicate that he/she had not 
                                                 
47 Kemp (2012) at 187. 
48 Humphreys v The State at para 18. 
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taken such a risk into the bargain. It is the interpretation and application of legal 
principles, not factual reasoning, that creates a binding legal precedent. For this reason, 
the Humphreys judgment does not automatically create a window of opportunity for 
irresponsible or dangerous drivers to escape intent based criminal liability. For 
example, it does not follow that the murder and attempted murder convictions handed 
down to Molemo "Jub Jub" Maarohanye and Themba Tshabalala by the Protea 
Magistrate’s Court in Soweto will be overturned. As illustrated by the hypothetical 
example, it is still entirely possible for a court of appeal (should the case go on appeal) 
to infer intent in the form of dolus eventualis from the accused’s conduct and the 
surrounding circumstances of the case.49 If an accused’s foresight could not dissuade or 
discourage him/her or alter his/her mind from embarking on a course of action from 
which it can be reasonably inferred that he/she had truly consented to risking the lives 
of others, then he/she may be found guilty of crimes requiring fault in the form of 
intent.  
According to South African criminal law, an actual or specific intent to kill is not 
the only form of intent sufficient for criminal liability in respect of charges of murder 
and attempted murder. Dolus eventualis, if it can be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, 
may show that an accused’s state of mind was less blameworthy, but it is sufficient for 
convictions of murder and attempted murder. The volitional component of dolus 
eventualis remains, as before, the distinguishing feature between cases of dolus 
eventualis and conscious negligence, since both these modes of fault are accompanied 
by subjective foresight of the possibility of causing death or serious injury.50 The SCA’s 
ruling has clarified and emphasised the importance of this already existing distinction.  
It might be argued that the SCA attached too much weight to the second part of 
the dolus eventualis enquiry.51 According to such argument, dolus eventualis should be 
determined by focusing primarily on the whether the accused had foreseen a 
substantial or concrete possibility at the time that he/she was engaging in the unlawful 
activity.52 It is submitted that this is an unsustainable argument, which is generally not 
supported by South African courts.53 Because we are dealing with a subjective inquiry, 
the problem cannot be solved only with reference to the probability of death or serious 
injury foreseen by the accused. The fact that the accused had foreseen a substantial or 
concrete possibility of death or serious injury does not provide conclusive proof 
concerning the true will of the accused. Would it not be possible for an accused to 
exhibit the following state of mind?  
                                                 
49 Snyman (2012) at 195. 
50 S v Ngubane at 685; Snyman (2012) at 194-195. 
51 See for example, Burchell (2011) at 385: “The volitional element remains at best a confusing and, at 
worst, an irrelevant inquiry” (footnote omitted); see also Snyman (2012) at 193 and Kemp (2012) at 191. 
52 Burchell (2011) at 385: “…foresight of anything less (ie remote possibility) should only qualify as 
conscious negligence if a reasonable person would have taken steps to guard against such possibility” 
(footnote omitted); see also Snyman (2012) at 193 and Kemp (2012) at 191. A detailed discussion of the 
ambit of the “foresight” or “cognitive” component of dolus eventualis is beyond the scope of this article. As 
argued throughout this article, the primary importance of the Humphreys judgment lies in the court’s 
interpretation of the volitional component of dolus eventualis. 
53 Snyman (2012) at 193. 
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“Yes, I was aware of a real risk of death or serious injury. Yes, I was reckless. Yes, I should 
have acted otherwise. However, I never harboured a desire to risk causing someone’s death. 
I mistakenly and genuinely believed that death would not occur.” 
If a reasonable inference indicates that these statements are true, the accused cannot be 
guilty of murder or attempted murder and will be guilty of culpable homicide due to 
conscious negligence. The Humphreys judgment illustrates the value of the volitional 
component of the test for dolus eventualis for determining the scope of an individual’s 
criminal liability, especially in relation to dangerous driving resulting in death or 
serious injury. This in turn will have a crucial impact on the determination of a guilty 
party’s punishment, as all forms of dolus are deemed more worthy of moral blame than 
forms of culpa and will likely result in a harsher sentence.54 
It is submitted that the NPA should bear the above in mind despite the failure to 
successfully prosecute Jacob Humphreys for intent based crimes. The judgment, albeit 
correct on the merits, does not and cannot entirely rule out dolus eventualis as the basis 
of intent for murder committed by other risk taking drivers, such as, Molemo “Jub Jub” 
Maarohanye and his co-accused. The Western Cape spokesman for the NPA, Eric 
Ntabazalila, is reported to have said that the NPA “would no longer be charging people 
with murder unless they could prove a direct intention to do so” (my emphasis).55 
Assuming the accuracy with which this statement was reported, this is clearly an over-
reaction to the Humphreys judgment. The Humphreys judgment does not constitute a 
blanket defence available to all irresponsible drivers against charges of murder or 
attempted murder.  
Ultimately, the NPA must continue to act on behalf of the public and in the 
interests of justice. At present the special attention given by the NPA to cases involving 
dangerous or reckless driving as well as its commitment to “the proper and effective 
prosecution of motor-vehicle accidents resulting in death” is surely warranted.56 The 
NPA, together with the courts, have a social responsibility towards ensuring that 
perpetrators are punished in accordance with their moral blameworthiness. In the 
presence of reliable evidence indicating intent in any form, this might entail charging 
those responsible for motor vehicle accidents with murder and/or attempted murder. 
The NPA’s strategy of pursuing heavier sentences for irresponsible drivers may be 
necessary in order to create a preventative and deterrent effect among South African 
road users. However, this strategy can only be pursued after the accused has been 
convicted of the appropriate crime.  
 
 
                                                 
54 Kemp (2012) at 188-189. 
55 See (n 3 above). 
56 “NPA welcomes legal certainty brought by the Jacob Jumphreys [sic]”, NPA Media Statement, 22 March 
2013, available at 
http://www.npa.gov.za/NewsClips/March%2022%202013%20NPA%20Welcomes%20Legal%20Certai
nty%20Brought%20By%20The%20Jacob%20Jumphreys%20Matter.pdf (accessed 30 March 2013). 
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6 CONCLUSION 
It is submitted that the decision in Humphreys is correct on the specific facts of the 
case.57 The judgment is logically argued as well as juridically sound. The judgment has 
also provided a great deal of clarity regarding the ambit of the volitional component 
of dolus eventualis, particularly the confusion surrounding repeated and often 
inappropriate references to recklessness as an essential component of dolus eventualis. 
Above all, it highlights that dolus is always determined with reference to the accused’s 
actual state of mind. In general, the judgment should prove to be a valuable legal 
precedent for determining whether an accused possessed fault in the form of dolus 
eventualis or luxuria, especially in cases involving blameworthy or extremely reckless 
driving. As highlighted in this article however, our courts and especially the NPA must 
be cautious in their interpretation of the judgment for use in future cases involving risk 
laden or reckless driving which results in death and/or serious injury to one or more 
persons. The Humphreys judgment does not provide a definitive answer to the question 
of the appropriate charges to bring in cases involving dangerous driving which lead to a 
loss of innocent life or serious injury. Specifically, it is argued that there may be extreme 
cases where the requirements of dolus eventualis are satisfied and where charges of 
murder or attempted murder (and also convictions on such charges) may not only be 
justified, but also necessary to preserve the public’s faith in the law.  
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